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Abstract In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status
of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law
and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular
conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal
regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the
practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and
important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his
reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument.
The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and
respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled
toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim,
we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular con-
science and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many
of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim,
we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of
liberal toleration.
Keywords Legal exemptions  Freedom of religion  Freedom of conscience 
Toleration  Brian  Leiter
In his stimulating book, Why Tolerate Religion?,1 Brian Leiter focuses on the problem
raised by the singling out of religion for special constitutional protection. In several
Western legal systems, religious beliefs and practices are treated differently from secular,
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non-religious commitments and identities, be they cultural, ethical, artistic, scientific,
linguistic, and so on. Western legal systems in practice single out religion for special
treatment; they both grant religion special protection which is not extended to non-reli-
gious ethical fundamental commitments and impose special disabilities on religions which
do not burden non-religious organizations and non-religious worldviews.2
Religion is burdened by special legal disabilities in countries with constitutional non-
establishment clauses. For instance, in the United States, the government may not support
and subsidize religious activities—yet no such ban applies to culture or the arts. Moreover,
religious practices enjoy special legal protection in the form of legal exemptions from
some general laws. By contrast, such protection is rarely available for non-religious
practices. For instance, in Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police allows members of
the Sikh community to depart from its traditional uniform in order to wear the turban.3 The
Supreme Court decided, in the Multani decision, that a Sikh schoolboy could wear the
kirpan, a ritual dagger, into the classroom despite the school Board’s regulations forbid-
ding students to bring knives in the classroom. However, no exemption from uniform rules
on appropriate headgear is available for, say, dedicated baseball fans wishing to wear
baseball caps at work or in the classroom.4
In his book, Leiter focuses on the special legal protection of religion. The puzzle that
such special treatment of religion gives rise to is that:
no one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument for tolerating
religion qua religion—that is, an argument that would explain why, as a matter of
moral principle, we ought to accord special legal and moral treatment to religious
practices. There are, to be sure, principled arguments for why the state ought to
tolerate a plethora of private choices and conscientious commitments, as well as
related practices of its citizenry, but none of these single out religion for anything
like the special treatment it is accorded in existing Western legal system. So why
tolerate religion? (p. 7).
Principled arguments for religious toleration are in fact arguments for tolerating those
personal commitments that are grounded in the individual’s conscience. These are
commitments about what one must do no matter what, not out of self-interest but ‘because
it is a kind of moral imperative central to one’s integrity as a person, to the meaning of
one’s life’ (p. 95, see also p. 34).
Many legal theorists and philosophers have recently drawn attention to the puzzling fact
that law gives special treatment to religion, and asked whether other conscientious com-
mitments should benefit from similar protection as religious conscience by virtue of their
similarity with it. They have asked what counts as religion, whether religion should be
2 For those two dimensions of the special legal status of religion (protection and disability), see Sch-
wartzman (2012).
3 There are exceptions to this general trend. For instance, as is well known, the United States’ Supreme
Court, both in the Seeger and Welsh decisions, decided that individuals could be exempted from forced
induction into the Army even though their pacifists convictions were not religious. The Court’s rationale was
that the secular convictions of the plaintiffs played a similar role in their lives as the one usually played by
religious convictions in the lives of believers. See United States v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v.
United States 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
4 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, (2006) 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC at para. 74.
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viewed as special by the law, and whether non-religious commitments analogous to reli-
gious claims should benefit from equal protection.5
In Why Tolerate Religion?, Leiter offers an incisive and spirited contribution to this
debate. He argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should
not be the only ground for exemptions and that this form of protection should be, in
principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last
chapter, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular
claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. In
general, he defends the view that, although exemptions should be available for secular and
religious conscientious claims alike, there should be no ‘burden-shifting exemptions’ (p.
99).6
We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and
philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise
questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not
religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. Leiter argues that the
defining features of religion are that it contains beliefs that make categorical demands upon
believers and that are insulated from reasons and evidence. Yet, it is difficult to see why the
latter feature should deserve any particular respect in itself; and so whatever is respectable
about religion is not specific to religion but is rather a manifestation of conscience, which
can also take a secular form (claim 1). The second claim is that respect for religion and
conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal
exemptions. This is because the only way to justify legal exemptions is via classical
theories of liberal toleration (claim 2).
In what follows, we dispute both claim 1 (the relevant features of both religion and
conscience) and claim 2 (the appropriate justification for legal exemptions). Against claim
1, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular
conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares
many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against claim 2, we
argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of
liberal toleration. The next two sections analyze both claims—the claim about religion and
conscience, and the claim about toleration—in turn.
Religion and Conscience
Before examining whether religion should be tolerated qua religion, Leiter attempts
to explain what the expressions ‘religion as such’ and ‘religion qua religion’ could mean.
Leiter argues that what makes religion unique and special is that in all religions there are at
least some central beliefs that 1) issue in categorical demands and 2) are insulated from
evidence and reasons (p. 33–34). Categoricity and insulation from reasons and evidence
are thus the two central distinctive features of the religious conscience. The latter epistemic
feature of religion, according to Leiter, specially singles out religion qua religion and
5 See for instance, Greenawalt (1984), Laycock (1996), McConnell (2000), Koppelman (2006), Eisgruber
and Sager (2007), Nussbaum (2008), Greene (2009), Maclure and Taylor (2011), Schwartzman (2012),
Dworkin (2013), Laborde (2014).
6 Those are exemptions that impose burdens on third parties who do not benefit from similar exemptions to
the law.
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distinguishes it from other types of beliefs placing categorical demands upon individuals,
such as those contained in political ideologies and secular moral codes.
Our goal in this section is to show that Leiter fails to identify the features which
demarcate religious conscientious commitments from non-religious ones. We demonstrate
that Leiter fails to establish insulation from reasons and evidence as the demarcating
feature of religion. This is because he draws on incompatible interpretations of ‘insulation
from reasons and evidence’ to reply to different challenges regarding either the under-
inclusiveness or the over-inclusiveness of his definition of religion. In brief, we argue that
in order to make sense of pre-theoretical intuitions about what conventionally counts as
religion, Leiter faces a dilemma. Either he relies on the view that insulation from reasons
and evidence is an individual epistemic attitude of believing despite the existence of
discrediting evidence, in which case he cannot distinguish religion from fanatical adher-
ence to any set of beliefs. Or he relies on a notion of insulation from reasons and evidence
as a property of beliefs which, by virtue of their content, cannot be validated or invalidated
by empirical evidence, in which case he cannot distinguish secular from religious con-
scientious commitments. As we will show, this is because the notion of ‘insulation from
reasons and evidence’, as Leiter presents it, contains ambiguities arising from three
sources: the subject of insulation from reasons and evidence, the meaning of the word
‘insulated’, and the meaning of ‘reasons and evidence’.
Insulation from Reasons and Evidence: Epistemic Attitudes and Religious Doctrines
Leiter does not provide a clear definition of his notion of ‘insulation from reasons and
evidence’. He rather unpacks its meaning throughout Chapter 2 while trying to separate
religious commitments from other kinds of conscientious commitments and beliefs. To get
the clear picture, we reconstruct his concept of insulation from reasons and evidence.
Leiter mobilizes two meanings of ‘insulation’ in order to give content to the idea of
‘insulation from reasons and evidence’. In the first sense, ‘insulation’ is a state of mind of
‘believing something notwithstanding the evidence and reasons that fail to support it or
even contradict it’ (p. 39). Here, religion is just blind faith. Defining religion as faith
insulated from reasons and evidence seems to make a lot of sense. In doing this, Leiter
follows Timothy Macklem who argues in ‘Faith as a Secular Value’ that faith sets religion
apart and explains the value of freedom of religion qua religion (2000).7 For Macklem, the
term ‘religion’ refers to ‘collective participation in institutions and practices that manifest a
freely given personal commitment to a particular set of beliefs, beliefs that are not based on
reason alone but are held, at least in part, on the basis of faith.’8 Note that under this
interpretation of insulation from reasons and evidence, the subject of insulation—that
which is insulated from reasons and evidence—is the believer himself. Faith is a subjective
epistemic attitude. For Macklem, indeed, faith is a mode of believing: it ‘describes the
manner in which a particular belief or set of beliefs may be subscribed to by human
beings.’9 Defining religion qua religion by referring to the notion of faith is, however, a
tricky matter. For instance, Kent Greenawalt claims that faith is too vague and too common
7 Macklem (2000).
8 Macklem (2000, p. 27).
9 Macklem (2000, p. 33). Many accounts of epistemology of religion understand faith as a subjective
epistemic attitude. See for instance, Audi (2011, pp. 54, 59) and Swinburne (1981, p. 118).
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to be used in a constitutional definition of religion qua religion.10 Macklem himself rec-
ognizes that ‘faith is not always exercised in relation to beliefs that would be conven-
tionally regarded as religious.’11 A concept of religion solely based on faith could thus be
over-inclusive.
In the second sense, religion is insulated from reasons and evidence because it ‘neither
claims support from empirical evidence nor purports to be constrained by empirical evi-
dence’ (p. 47). Religious belief is insulated from evidence ‘not only in the sense that it does
not answer to empirical evidence but also in the sense that it does not even aspire to answer
such evidence’ (Ibid.). Leiter relies on this interpretation of the term ‘insulation’ when he
says that religious beliefs express metaphysical propositions that purport to refer to the
essence or ultimate reality of the world and transcend ordinary and empirical experience
(pp. 47–49). It is not implausible to think that religious propositions are somehow insulated
from certain kinds of evidence and modes of rational justification precisely because of their
metaphysical content. Religion undeniably makes metaphysical claims and those claims
appear to many to be insulated from empirical validation. For instance, Karl Popper
famously claimed that the demarcation between science and metaphysics is that proposi-
tions belonging to the latter could not, in principle, be falsified.12 There is no way to test
metaphysical claims; they are by their very nature insulated from empirical evidence and
not disprovable by facts and experiments. In a similar (yet different) way, logical posi-
tivists, such as A.J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap, claimed that metaphysical propositions, since
they cannot be reduced to empirically observable sense-data contents, have no truth-
conditions, cannot be either true or false, and are therefore non-sensical.13 In this second
understanding, the subject of religion’s insulation from reasons and evidence is not the
believer but the religious doctrines themselves. In this view, religion is insulated from
reasons and evidence, not because of the subjective attitude of individuals with regard to
evidence, but rather because of the very nature of religious doctrines.
The upshot is that we have two very different notions of ‘insulation from reasons and
evidence’. One refers to the fact that someone believes in something notwithstanding the
evidence that fails to support his belief or contradicts it. The other refers to the view that,
according to the correct understanding of certain beliefs, such beliefs cannot be proven or
disproven with certain kinds of evidence and reasons.
Note that these understandings of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ may seem to
be incompatible. That is, the same belief cannot be said, without contradiction, to be
insulated from reasons and evidence in both senses. For according to the first interpretation
of religion’s epistemic insulation, a religious belief is insulated from reasons and evidence
when the holder of such belief adopts an epistemic attitude of indifference to the reasons
and evidence which actually contradicts (or fails to support) the belief in question. The
individual holding belief X believes in X notwithstanding the existence of evidence Y and
reason Z counting against X. This implies that belief X itself is not insulated from reasons
and evidence as Y and Z can invalidate it. Yet, under the second interpretation, a belief X
is itself insulated from reasons and evidence when it is such that no evidence Y or reason Z
can validate or invalidate it.
10 Greenawalt (1984, pp. 768–769).
11 Macklem (2000, pp. 27–28).
12 Popper (2002, pp. 345–346).
13 Ayer (1952). Carnap embraced a more ‘liberal’ and permissive criterion of meaning (confirmability). See
Carnap (1953).
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One may object that there is no necessary incompatibility between the two notions of
‘insulation from reasons and evidence’. For instance, someone holding that religion is
insulated from reasons and evidence could argue that the two senses of insulation nicely
support one another. On this view, religion simply combines the two epistemic features: it
is characterized by a subjective attitude of faith in ideas which cannot objectively be
validated or refuted in the light of reasons and evidence. This objector would be immune to
our inconsistency objection. However, such a person could not be the author of Why
Tolerate Religion? Indeed—and as we’ll show further in sections ‘‘The Concept of Reli-
gion: Under-Inclusiveness and Over-Inclusiveness’’ and ‘‘The Epistemology of Secular and
Religious Conscientious Commitments’’—Leiter hesitates on the key question of whether
religious beliefs are actually (objectively) insulated from reasons and evidence.
At several passages, Leiter claims that religious belief is false belief, unwarranted belief,
or belief that contradicts evidence from modern science (pp. x, 39, 42). When he does so, he
depicts religious belief as a subjective attitude of blind faith in ideas despite evidence against
them or despite lack of evidence. This is the interpretation of religion’s epistemic insulation
mobilized by Leiter to explain why even non-fideist and intellectualist accounts of religion
are nonetheless epistemically insulated. It is also the interpretation of religion’s epistemic
insulation conveyed by the definition of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ as ‘believing
in something notwithstanding the evidence and reasons that fail to support it or even con-
tradict it’ (p. 39), or as ‘insulation from revision in the light of evidence’ (p. 40) or as
persisting in believing into something despite evidence to the contrary (pp. 41–42). Here, it
appears, religious beliefs can objectively be refuted in the light of reasons and evidence.
However, when trying to distinguish religion from any form of fanatical belief, Leiter
relies on the second interpretation of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’, namely, the
view that religious beliefs themselves, when properly understood, are indifferent to reasons
and evidence. This is the notion of religion’s epistemic insulation which underlies the
claim that religious beliefs are metaphysical in nature (p. 49) and which seems to underpin
the distinction between moral judgments and religious ones from the point of view of
moral realism (p. 50). Here, it is the nature of religious beliefs that they cannot be
objectively refuted in the light of reasons and evidence.
The Concept of Religion: Under-Inclusiveness and Over-Inclusiveness
We can see how the equivocal character of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ is
significant when we turn to the argumentative strategies Leiter employs to attempt to single
out religion qua religion.
Leiter argues that to properly single out conventional religion on the basis of its
insulation from reasons and evidence, we have to locate the subject of the said insulation in
the religious doctrines themselves, not in the believers themselves. Religion’s insulation
from reasons and evidence is ‘a claim about the religious doctrine rather than about the
typical epistemic attitudes of believers’ (p. 35).
This is necessary to distinguish religion from mere fanatical adherence to any set of
beliefs. To take Leiter’s examples, the existence of a fanatical defender of the theory of
gravity who ‘does not even worry about how evidence of the expansion of the universe
squares with [this] theory’ does not make the theory of gravity a religion (p. 35). Similarly,
Marxism is not a religion, even if some Marxists (‘committed communists’, p. 40) dis-
regard—or do not bother examining—empirical evidence. Correctly understood, Marxism
is a theory of historical change which is supposed to answer the same standards of evidence
and rational justification as any other scientific theory (p. 38). By contrast, we understand
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that if religion is to be distinct from the theory of gravity and classical Marxism, it is
because it stands in a different relation to those standards of evidence and rational justi-
fication; religious doctrines themselves, not believers in their individual epistemic atti-
tudes, are not supposed to be responsive to such evidence.
So far, so good. Yet, things get messy when we turn our attention to ambiguities
concerning the kinds of reasons and evidence from which religion is allegedly insulated.
Leiter starts with a very broad notion of ‘reasons and evidence’ and he asserts that religion
is insulated from reasons and evidence ‘as these are understood in other domains con-
cerned with knowledge of the world’ and from ‘ordinary standards of evidence and rational
justification, the ones we employ in both common sense and in science’ (p. 34), thereby
only excluding divine revelation from ‘reasons and evidence’.
The problem with this is that it provides an under-inclusive definition of religion, one
which rules out any belief in the existence of God supported by philosophical modes of
rational enquiry abiding to the laws of logic and sound inference. Examples include St-
Anselm and Descartes’s ontological argument (it is inconceivable that God lacks the
predicate of existence),14 Kant’s transcendental argument from morality (God’s existence
is necessary for the existence of objective moral truths and of moral agents),15 Aquinas’s
five arguments for the existence of God based on natural reason,16 Ibn Rushd’s (Aver-
roes’s) teleological argument (there must be an intelligent creator, since the working of the
whole world is fine-tuned to serve the purpose of humanity),17 and Aristotle’s cosmo-
logical argument (there must be a first uncaused or sui-generis cause for the existence of
everything that exists).18 Perhaps, of course, those are bad and fallacious arguments. Kant
himself, and many others, raised philosophical objections against the ontological, teleo-
logical and cosmological arguments.19 Yet, when one asserts that those kinds of arguments
supporting some beliefs expressing religious propositions are erroneous arguments, one is
bound to recognize, ipso facto, that these (religious) beliefs are not insulated from rational
enquiry; they can be disproved by such a rational and philosophical enquiry.20
Leiter claims that those rationalist interpretations of conventional religious belief are the
fruit of mere ‘post hoc rationalization’ and that those beliefs, although purportedly justified
by rational means, are still insulated from revision in the light of evidence, because,
according to him: ‘it never turns out that the fundamental beliefs are revised in light of new
evidence’ (p. 40). In other words, Leiter’s strategy to avoid the conclusion that rationalist
interpretations of religion are not religious, is to claim that those who make such rational
arguments in support of their religious belief are still, at the level of their subjective
epistemic attitudes, insulating themselves from reasons and evidence.
Nothing in what Leiter says to present non-fideist accounts of religion as being insulated
from reasons and evidence implies that the religious beliefs and doctrines which are
purportedly justified by rational philosophical arguments are themselves insulated from
reasons and evidence. Quite to the contrary, as noted earlier, the fact that so many have
provided counter-arguments and objections to rational arguments for the existence of God,
14 Descartes (1993, pp. 24–35, 42–47), St-Anselm (1965, pp. 3–6).
15 Kant (1943, pp. 451–460).
16 Aquinas (1947, pp. 11–14).
17 Averroes (1967).
18 Aristotle (1933, pp. 139–145).
19 Kant (1943, pp. 331–359).
20 In fact, Leiter admits on p. 62 that philosophical reflection does not run the risk of commitment to a
system of beliefs insulated from reasons and evidence.
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and that Leiter himself insinuates that they can or should be revised in light of new
evidence, implies that such beliefs are themselves not insulated from rational objections
and from discrediting evidence. Leiter is thus only able to incorporate rationalistic inter-
pretation of religious belief into the concept of religion at the price of abandoning the
concept of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ which allows him to distinguish reli-
gious belief from fanatical adherence to any kind of belief.
There is one way in which Leiter could avoid the problem of under-inclusiveness of the
concept of religion while locating insulation from reasons and evidence at the level of
religious beliefs themselves. He could narrow his understanding of the relevant kinds of
reasons and evidence from which conventional religion is insulated so as to exclude the
kind of philosophical justification usually alluded to in rational arguments in support of
religious belief. Leiter veers towards such a narrowing strategy in later parts of his book.
Although he starts with a very broad interpretation of ‘insulation from reasons and evi-
dence’ (encompassing standards accepted in all forms of knowledge other than religion),
he moves towards the view that religion is only insulated from hard empirical evidence and
standards of justification accepted in science (pp. 38, 57) and, sometimes, only from
empirical evidence (p. 47). Thus perhaps the demarcating feature of conventional religious
beliefs is that they are, when properly understood, insulated from naturalist standards of
justification. This seems to fit quite well with the claim that religious beliefs are insulated
from reasons and evidence because they express metaphysical propositions which tran-
scend the world of ordinary experience.
Yet, as Leiter remarks, some religious beliefs are purportedly supported by one type of
empirical evidence, namely by past testimonial evidence recorded by written sources. For
instance, the Gospels provide testimony of the existence of Jesus Christ, of his performance
of miracles and of his resurrection. Leiter claims, however, that since such testimonial
evidence contradicts massive amounts of different testimonial evidence and of the evi-
dence from biology and physiology, it should be given no credence so that ‘devout
Catholics who still persist in believing in the resurrection of Christ hold that belief insu-
lated from reasons and evidence’ (p. 42). Once again, what Leiter demonstrates here is that
religious believers are themselves insulated from reasons and evidence in the sense that
they are blinded by faith and continue to believe in something notwithstanding the evi-
dence against it. He does not show that the beliefs in question are themselves insulated
from reasons and evidence. Quite to the contrary, those beliefs can be shown to be false by
appealing to ‘massive amount of testimonial evidence, as well as the evidence of physi-
ology and biology’ (p. 42). They are therefore not insulated from empirical evidence and
standards of rational justification as these are understood in the natural sciences.
The Epistemology of Secular and Religious Conscientious Commitments
We should, however, refrain from quickly jumping to the conclusion that insulation from
reasons and evidence cannot be the distinctive feature of religion. Perhaps the previous
objection draws too much on particular examples and only applies to some religious beliefs
(those allegedly supported by testimonial evidence but in fact refuted by more evidence).
Leiter may still claim that these beliefs are not the ones that are crucial for the singling out
of religion as such, as these are not beliefs issuing in categorical demands upon the
believers. And he may claim that it is those categorical beliefs, because they express
metaphysical propositions and are insulated from empirical evidence, that are distinctive of
religion.
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Leiter does not show that religious doctrines contain such central beliefs (that issue in
categorical demands and are insulated from reasons and evidence in the relevant way) yet
this is quite a plausible assumption. For instance, certain strands of Buddhism assert that
the act of eating meat spreads fear among living creatures and goes against the virtue of
compassion and that it should therefore be prohibited to eat sentient beings; members of
the Religious Society of Friends, the Quakers, believe that all wars and outward fighting
proceed from men’s lust and derive a categorical commitment to pacifism from this belief;
21 members of the Hutterian Brethren Church of Wilson believe that the second com-
mandment (‘You shall not make for yourself an idol’) is a divine prescription which
forbids them from having photographs taken of them.22
Such beliefs issuing in categorical demands seem to be widespread in conventional
religions and are arguably insulated from empirical evidence and standards of justification
found in natural sciences. Have we thus found a way of singling out religion as such by
using an unambiguous notion of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’? Hardly: this
concept of religion makes religious claims of conscience very similar to the categorical
demands of the secular moral conscience placed upon non-believers. Indeed, a secular
belief that all human beings are equal in dignity, and that this generates certain categorical
demands (not to kill other human beings, not to discriminate on the basis of race, gender
and religious belief) seems to be as much insulated from empirical evidence and standards
of justification used in the natural sciences as the religious beliefs mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraph. A secular belief that violence and the use of weapons to kill other human
beings is always wrong generates a commitment to pacifism that can be as much insulated
from empirical evidence as the commitment of the pacifist Quakers. And a secular belief
that life has intrinsic value can ground an ethical commitment to vegetarianism while being
just as impossible to prove with empirical evidence and the tools of modern science as the
vegetarian Buddhist’s convictions.23
Leiter is reluctant to analogize religious prescriptions with secular morality in such a
way. He claims that religious categorical demands are distinct from moral commands in
general (p. 49–52). This is surprising since he also asserts that claims of conscience, all
claims of conscience, including religious ones, are moral imperatives: ‘[a] claim of con-
science is, after all, a claim about what one must do, no matter what—not as a matter of
crass self-interest but because it is a kind of moral imperative central to one’s integrity as a
person, to the meaning of one’s life’ (p. 95).
If this is so, why does Leiter insist in viewing religious claims of conscience, making
categorical demands about what one must do, as being so different from the claims of
secular morality? Leiter’s strategy is to analyze religious propositions and moral propo-
sitions from the point of view of meta-ethics, that is, from the point of view of the
semantics of moral propositions (what we take judgements of right and wrong, good and
bad, to be about) and of the metaphysics of such propositions (whether or not we take
moral facts to exist). Leiter remains agnostic with regard to those meta-ethical questions
and attempts to show that on any possible account of the semantics and metaphysics of
21 Fox and others (1660).
22 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567.
23 Of course, a certain strand of meta-ethical theory, known as ethical naturalism or naturalistic cognitivism,
claims that moral properties are reducible to natural and non-moral properties. Leiter claims that, in this
view, moral statements are answerable to evidence as understood in the natural sciences. We will discuss the
implications of this claim for the alleged distinction between religious claims of conscience and secular
claims of conscience in section ‘‘The Epistemology of Secular and Religious Conscientious Commitments’’.
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moral claims, it appears that morality and religion differ in light of the insulation from
reasons and evidence criterion. As we demonstrate in the following, however, Leiter puts
forward a brave but ultimately too sweeping analysis of complex questions of meta-ethics
and epistemology of religion.
Leiter proceeds by arguing that either on realist accounts of morality, such as Peter
Railton’s or Richard Boyd’s, or on antirealist accounts of morality, such as expressivism,
religion differs from morality on the basis of the former’s insulation from empirical evi-
dence and scientific methods.
Religious claims of conscience, according to Leiter, fit neither cognitivist realism nor
non-cognitivist antirealism (p. 50–51). Moral realism asserts that moral propositions refer
to moral facts about the world. Therefore, argues Leiter, from the realist’s perspective,
moral propositions are not insulated from reasons and evidence as is religion. On the other
hand, antirealism asserts that moral sentences do not express beliefs about the world: they
merely express subjective attitudes of approval and disapproval and therefore lack truth-
conditions. Such a non-cognitivist and expressivist stance implies that moral judgements
are insulated from beliefs and evidence and cannot be true or false. Leiter asserts that
religious claims of conscience do not lack truth-conditions in this way since they purport to
express something about the world and thus ‘in principle, could be answerable to reasons
and evidence, but are nonetheless taken to be insulated from them’ (p. 51).
This argument is fallacious since it presents us with a false dichotomy and misrepresents
both realism and non-cognitivism. First, Leiter relies on a false dichotomy. Several strands
of moral realism view moral propositions as referring to non-natural moral facts such that
the truth and falsity of moral judgements cannot be established by appealing to empirical
evidence and scientific methods. For instance, G.E. Moore developed an intuitionist form
of moral realism asserting that moral facts are not empirically observable and detectable
with the tools of the natural sciences and that humans have a faculty of intuition allowing
us to directly observe non-natural moral properties, such as ‘goodness’, which are non-
reducible and non-identical to natural properties.24 According to this cognitivist under-
standing of morality, moral beliefs are insulated from empirical evidence and rational
justifications as understood in the natural sciences. Other forms of non-naturalistic realism
also assert that, although there are moral facts, those are non-natural facts which are not the
subject-matter of empirical sciences. For instance, John McDowell, a moral realist, views
moral facts as facts about the reasons that we have to act in certain ways and claims that we
can be brought to recognize via proper upbringing.25
Leiter could of course maintain that these non-naturalist accounts of moral realism are
implausible. However, his argument would thereby lose its meta-ethical agnosticism and
become hostage to a controversial meta-ethical position. Even if he were ready to bite this
bullet and to defend the truth of naturalist moral realism, Leiter would still have to explain
how certain core elements of the versions of naturalist moral realism he refers to are not, at
least partially, insulated from empirical evidence and scientific demonstration. For
instance, for Railton, whom Leiter takes as representative of naturalist moral realism, a
person’s good is determined from an individual idealized point of view of full information
24 Moore (1903).
25 Miller (2003, p. 258); Cf.McDowell (1984). Leiter is aware of those alternative moral epistemologies. In
a footnote, he dismisses, without arguing, McDowell’s and all other non-naturalist types of moral realism as
being implausible. He also recognizes that certain strands of Kantian ethics and of intuitionism ‘have quite a
lot in common with religion’ (p. 153). However, he does not explain why this point does not jeopardize his
argument for maintaining a sharp separation between religious prescriptions and secular moral obligations.
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and consists in ‘what [this person] would want himself to want, or to pursue, were he to
contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully and vividly informed about
himself and his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental
rationality.’26 Moral rightness, in turn, is viewed by Railton as what is rational from an
idealized social point of view so that what is morally right is ‘what would be rationally
approved of were the interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under
circumstances of full and vivid information.’27 It is difficult to imagine how the counter-
factual judgements that would be obtained in such idealized situations could be entirely
based on empirical evidence and the methods of the natural sciences. Rather, determining
the parameters and outcomes of idealized individual and social rational decision-making
procedures seems to invite at least some speculative philosophical reasoning roughly akin
to the one at play in the above-mentioned rational arguments in support of religious beliefs
and their objections.
In brief, Leiter exaggerates the extent to which, under the cognitivist umbrella, moral
beliefs answer to empirical evidence and scientific proofs. If that is the case, it is difficult to
distinguish moral and religious beliefs in the way that he wants to. Now, how does Leiter
conceives the relation between secular morality and religion from the antirealist stand-
point? Leiter surprisingly asserts that from an expressivist point of view all moral prop-
ositions differ from religious ones, precisely because they are insulated from reasons and
evidence as understood from a naturalist point of view. For expressivists, moral statements
are not apt to be true or false because they merely express subjective feelings, emotions or
attitudes of approval or disapproval.
Leiter’s strategy is thus to claim that religion is insulated from evidence in a different way
than moral propositions expressing subjective feelings: ‘religious judgements do express
beliefs’. They could ‘in principle,… be answerable to reasons and evidence, but are none-
theless taken to be insulated from them’ (p. 51). This strategy has a number of flaws. To begin
with, it makes Leiter, once again, rely on the view that religion’s insulation from reasons and
evidence has to do with believers’ epistemic attitudes (‘they are taken to be insulated’) rather
than with the beliefs themselves, since those are presented as being in principle not insulated
from reasons and evidence. The problemwith this, as we saw, is that this viewmakes religion
indistinguishable from any fanatical adherence to any set of beliefs.
Furthermore, why would expressivists interpret the value judgements made by religious
individuals as referring to external facts rather than merely expressing subjective feelings?
An expressivist views all propositions taking a form like ‘X must do Y because of Z’, ‘Y is
good’, ‘Y is good because of Z’ as propositions expressing the subjective feelings of the
speaker rather than purporting to describe some objective moral state of affairs. This is so
regardless of the religious character of the proposition (of Z in the example above). Why
would an expressivist accept that the secular vegetarian stating his convictions only
expresses an attitude of disapproval towards meat-eating but that the Buddhist vegetarian
purports to describe some state of affairs when stating his own commitment? As Dworkin
explains, religions do have a ‘science department’, a set of beliefs purporting to describe
how the world really is. Yet, they also have, as Dworkin maintains, a ‘value department’:
they contain beliefs which are moral in character as they concern what individuals must do,
what has intrinsic value, and so on.28 For an expressivist, propositions pertaining to the
value department of religions are just as much expressions of subjective attitudes insulated
26 Railton (1986a, p. 16).
27 Railton (1986b, p. 190).
28 Dworkin (2013, pp. 22–23).
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from empirical evidence as non-religious moral propositions. There is nothing special
about religion here. Moreover, recall that for the most prominent theorist of expressivism,
A.J. Ayer, even descriptive or ‘scientific’ religious propositions, such as ‘God exists’ are
non-sensical, to the same extent that moral ones are: they have no truth conditions and
would thus be, in Leiter’s terminology, insulated from reasons and evidence.29 So it seems
that in both major accounts of meta-ethics, Leiter fails to distinguish religious claims of
conscience from secular morality. The idea that religion is insulated from reasons and
evidence cannot be the demarcating feature which singles out religion vis-a`-vis secular
morality.
In sum, it seems that Leiter either fails to distinguish religion from fanatical adherence to
any kind of belief (when he views insulation from reasons and evidence as a subjective
attitude) or he cannot distinguish religion from secular moral doctrines (when he relies on
the notion of insulation from empirical evidence and naturalist standards of justification as a
property of religious doctrines). This is a serious shortcoming in Leiter’s overall approach to
the problem of singling out religion. Leiter attempts to solve this problem by asking whether
there are good reasons to tolerate religion, as such, given its defining features. But as the
defining features he provides are not specific to religion, they do not help us answer the
question as to whether we should tolerate religion. Leiter, in particular, has not explained
why we should tolerate secular conscience, given that conscience shares the very features he
singles out as specifically religious.
Existential Consolation and Secular Worldviews
Leiter may claim that our analysis has left out an important feature of religious belief
which distinguishes religion from other worldviews and systems of thought. He may claim
that what ultimately distinguishes religious beliefs from morality in general and from
secular worldviews and political ideologies is that religion offers existential consolation: it
‘render[s] intelligible and tolerable the basic existential facts about human life, such as
suffering and death’ (p. 52). This is unconvincing.
First, Leiter himself recognizes that non-religious philosophical reflection, meditation
and therapeutic treatment provide existential consolation (p. 62). He claims that those
forms of existential consolation are not insulated from reasons and evidence, without
specifying what kind of epistemic insulation is at play here. Much philosophical reflection
is insulated from standards of evidence as narrowly defined in the natural sciences, for
example. Furthermore, philosophers since the Ancient period have produced countless
ethical systems and worldviews aiming at providing existential consolation. Perhaps, Leiter
would argue that these were all religious philosophies. So be it. Yet, more recently, atheist
philosophers concerned with the relation between secular philosophy and religion have
tried to explain how non-theistic philosophical doctrines could provide some form of
existential consolation. For instance, Thomas Nagel explains that a few secular options
(humanism, Nietzschean Darwinism, and a revised form of Platonism) could provide at
least a partial answer to the ‘cosmic question’ of how to live in harmony with the universe
as a whole and not just as an individual in it.30 Ronald Dworkin, in the very last moments
of his life, wrote that we can make sense of immortality by viewing one’s life as an
objectively and timelessly valuable achievement.31 Perhaps those secular attempts are vain
29 Ayer (1952, p. 115).
30 Nagel (2010, pp. 3–17).
31 Dworkin (2013, pp. 155–159).
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and ultimately fail to provide existential consolation. However, this failure cannot, from
Leiter’s point of view, be the site of the distinction between religious beliefs and secular
philosophical worldviews since he understands the former, as we have seen, as being either
false or improvable. Claiming that secular philosophy’s actual failure to provide existential
consolation distinguishes it from religion as a provider of existential consolation would put
Leiter at odds with his own sceptical treatment of religion.
To recap, many non-religious doctrines contain beliefs that (1) are insulated from
reasons and evidence, (2) make categorical demands and (3) provide existential consola-
tion. Leiter’s definition of religion proves to be over-inclusive and does not allow him to
single out religion. As a result, he has not explained why secular conscience, when it
displays the same problematically epistemic features as religion, deserves respect.
Toleration, Respect and Exemptions
Let us now turn to what Leiter exactly means by ‘tolerating’ and ‘respecting’ religion and
conscience. Leiter’s argument can be summarized as follows:
1. Existing theories of principled toleration cannot justify tolerating religion qua religion
(Chapter 3).
2. Religion qua religion does not deserve special respect—i.e., ‘appraisal’ respect
(Chapter 4).
3. Therefore, there are no good reasons for granting exemptions to religion qua religion.
Exemptions, if they are justifiable at all, should be available for both the religious and
the non-religious conscience.
4. Moreover, there are no good reasons to grant exemptions for burden-shifting claims of
conscience (religious or otherwise).
Although we are sympathetic to Leiter’s conclusion that the special legal status of
religion with regard to exemptions to the law is problematic (3), we do not think that this
conclusion follows from the argument he develops in his book. For Leiter’s conclusion (3)
to follow, premises (1) and (2) need to be complemented by another premise, namely, that:
(2bis) legal exemptions can only be justified on the basis of principled toleration or on
the basis of appraisal respect.
Yet, as we will argue in this section, this underlying premise (2bis) is mistaken on two
grounds. First, there is no straightforward connection between principled toleration and
practices of exemptions. Second, such practices need not be justified by an attitude of
appraisal respect. In addition, we will argue that Leiter’s version of the No-exemption
(except for non-burden-shifting claims of conscience) approach (4) is morally problematic
as it does not derive from a principled argument.
Theories of Toleration, Theories of Exemptions, and Respect-Based Theories
of Exemptions
Leiter’s argument against the special status of religion stages a nexus of relationships
between the notions of toleration, respect and legal exemptions. Properly to assess this
argument, we first make a few preliminary distinctions and observations.
First, toleration is conceptually linked to a negative attitude of disapproval or dislike
towards the practice that is tolerated. The ‘circumstances of toleration’ imply that
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individuals or groups espouse practices or beliefs which are disliked or disapproved of by
the groups who have the power to interfere with those beliefs and practices.32 As Susan
Mendus remarks: ‘[w]e cannot, properly speaking, be said to tolerate things which we
welcome, or endorse, or find attractive.’33 Thus, tolerating others who are different from us
is distinct from respecting them on the basis of approval or admiration of what makes them
different.34 Such a positive attitude of respect and support for others’ differences is often
seen as going ‘beyond toleration’35 Leiter embraces this distinction. He claims that tol-
eration is hardly distinguishable from an attitude based on ‘recognition respect’, which
simply requires one not to violate basic moral requirements and general moral obligations
owed to others as persons. He then contrasts this ‘negative’ form of respect (not infringing
others’ rights) from a more ‘positive’ form of respect, which he calls ‘appraisal respect’,
and which involves expressing admiration and high esteem of someone because of his or
her valuable achievements (pp. 69–72). Toleration and appraisal respect are thus two
distinct attitudes. It is in light of those two attitudes that Leiter discusses the special legal
status of religion vis-a`-vis legal exemptions, investigating whether one or the other pro-
vides grounds for treating religion as the unique recipient of legal exemptions.
Second, we must distinguish between a theory of toleration and a theory of legal
exemptions. Toleration is associated with the separation of church and state as it emerged
in the aftermath of the European religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Toleration is based on the creation of a protected private sphere of non-interference in
which the individual is free to adopt his or her own religious or moral views; it shields
certain areas of private life from political intervention.36 John Locke conceived of toler-
ation in this way: he famously argued that political power should be limited to the pro-
tection of ‘civil interests’, namely the preservation of ‘liberty, health, and indolency of
body; and the possession of outward things’, and that the power of the state should not
extend to ‘the salvation of souls.’37 Note that, for Locke, although political authority
should never be exercised for the pursuit of spiritual goals (for instance, in order to convert
religious dissidents and suppress their views), the government is entitled to restrict the free
exercise of religion when this is necessary to further civil interests. Here, toleration only
requires non-interference in the private sphere and nothing like a right to manifest one’s
religious beliefs in the public realm. It does not require protecting religious freedom by
granting legal exemptions from laws pursuing valid civic goals. As Locke claims: ‘the
private judgement of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the
public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation.’38
Toleration requires governments to refrain from interfering with certain unpopular
practices or beliefs on the ground that these practices or beliefs are disliked or disapproved
by the dominant group.39 Toleration is nonetheless compatible with certain forms of
32 Galeotti (1993, p. 587). See also Waldron (1988, p. 63), Williams (1996, p. 19), Scanlon (2003, p. 187).
33 Mendus (1988, p. 3).
34 For instance, Galeotti (2002, pp. 21–22).
35 Walzer (1997, p. 52).
36 Kymlicka (1992, pp. 34–35).
37 Locke (1998, p. 7).
38 Locke (1998, p. 39). For a similar interpretation of Locke, see Gutmann (2000, pp. 129–131), claiming
that Locke, as well as Madison and Jefferson, understood freedom of religion to be ‘freedom within the
limits of law that serve public purposes and that are not intended to limit religious freedom’ (at 131).
39 We follow Leiter in presenting toleration as a virtue of political institutions, even though many authors
prefer to refer to the ideal of state neutrality.
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interference that are not justified on the basis that some practices and beliefs are false,
morally inferior, or repugnant. Thus, toleration does not preclude interference justified by
an appeal to some neutral (non-perfectionist) grounds such as, for instance, the necessity to
restrict the liberty of individuals who want to exercise their liberty in harmful ways,
leading to the negation of others’ fundamental rights. There is also no contradiction in
claiming that toleration is compatible with allowing some religious practices to be
restricted because this is required to pursue some legitimate and neutral collective goal,
such as ensuring security, health and safety.
A theory of legal exemptions, on the other hand, goes further than this. It must explain
why it is sometimes permissible, or even required by justice, for a government to allow
some individuals or groups not to comply with certain laws of general applicability, which
are neutrally justified and pursue legitimate collective objectives.40 Exemptionism is more
demanding than toleration as it is usually understood. The latter forbids all interferences
based on non-neutral reasons and the former forbids some interferences based on neutral
justifications. A theory of legal exemptions is premised on the view that sometimes tol-
eration as non-interference (or, more precisely, no interference for non-neutral reasons) is
insufficient to adequately protect the political values of the liberal state. A theory of legal
exemptions explains, for instance, why granting Sikhs an exemption to helmet laws may be
required or desirable, which is left unaddressed by standard accounts of toleration. Indeed,
standard accounts of toleration are preoccupied with cases of direct discrimination or
religious persecution in which certain groups are targeted by laws or practices imposing a
special burden upon them because they are disliked by those in power. They are not
preoccupied with cases of indirect discrimination, that is, unforeseen and unintended
discrimination resulting from the application of neutrally justified laws and regulations. In
general, theories of exemptions explain that liberty of religion and of conscience needs
more robust protection than toleration as non-interference because neutrally justified laws
sometimes impose an unfair burden upon some individuals.41
Third, the view that religion should be treated as special under the law by being the sole
recipient of exemptions to the law can also be based on the notion of appraisal respect for
religion. Some theories of religious freedom are (appraisal) respect-based. Those theories
assert that religious freedom deserves special constitutional protection because religious
practices and beliefs are worthy of esteem and admiration. In this view, religious freedom
protects the intrinsic value of religious devotion or the instrumental value of religion, that
is, its distinctive capacity to bring about desirable outcomes. Respect-based theories of
religious freedom claim that religious practices and beliefs ought to be protected because
they are a necessary constituent of the human good or because religious devotion is
socially useful. Michael Sandel puts forth such a theory of religious freedom. He claims
that ‘[t]he case for according special protection to the free exercise of religion presupposes
that religious belief, as characteristically practiced in a particular society, produces ways of
being and acting that are worthy of honor and appreciation—either because they are
admirable in themselves or because they foster qualities of character that make good
40 Leiter also seems to understand toleration and freedom of conscience as freedom within the boundaries of
generally applicable laws pursuing legitimate collective goals that do not directly aim at restricting freedom
of conscience. He thus claims, for instance, that toleration allows the state to restrict freedom of conscience
‘as long as its objective in doing so is not to suppress or coercively burden those claims of conscience but to
achieve some conception of the good’ (p. 117, Cf. 115, 124).
41 Bou-Habib (2006), Quong (2006), Seglow (2010), Shorten (2010), Boucher (2011), Maclure and Taylor
(2011).
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citizens.’42 Starting from such an (appraisal) respect-based theory of religious freedom,
one could argue that the purpose of exemptions to the law is to protect or promote what is
good and valuable in religion.
With those preliminary observations in mind, let us now turn to Leiter’s argument. In
order to assess whether there are good reasons to grant religion a special legal status, Leiter
turns to three principled arguments for toleration and asks whether under each of those
three accounts, we have good reasons to tolerate religion as such (Chapter 3). He addresses
a Rawlsian contractualist argument, a Millian epistemic argument and a utilitarian argu-
ment. In what follows, we argue that this strategy wrongly assumes that there is a direct
logical route between toleration and practices of exemption. We show that the first two
arguments for toleration are not designed to justify legal exemptions in the first place (2.2)
and the third one, while it can be formulated as an argument for religious exemptions, turns
out to be an (appraisal) respect-based argument. As a result, Leiter ignores those theories
which justify legal exemptions not because they are required by toleration, nor because
religion is especially valuable (including on utilitarian grounds), but on other grounds—
such as equality or fairness (2.3). In sum, Leiter has not looked in the right place, and has
therefore failed to take seriously the most convincing arguments in favour of legal
exemptions. We develop this line of criticism in the next two sections before turning to
Leiter’s view regarding the No-exemption approach.
Toleration and Exemptions
In order to answer the question as to whether special religious exemptions can be justified,
Leiter asks whether classical theories of toleration single out religion as special. Yet—we
argue—this confuses two distinct inquiries, and there is no reason to think that a negative
answer to the latter will generate a negative answer to the former.
Of the three arguments for toleration that Leiter discusses, the first two turn out to be
unconnected with practices of exemptions, and the third is an argument based on appraisal
respect. So none is fit for Leiter’s purpose; but there is nothing surprising about this. Leiter
is right to point out that the special status given to religion in most Western legal system
raises important philosophical questions. Leiter is also right to examine the grounds of
religious liberty in order to determine whether non-religious commitments should benefit
from similar constitutional protection. Yet, he errs when he assumes that classical theories
of toleration can provide the grounds for practices of religious exemptions.
The Rawlsian contractualist argument asserts that the contracting parties of the original
position would choose the principle of equal liberty since they ‘cannot take chances with
their liberty by permitting dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress
others if it wishes.’43 The Millian epistemic argument claims that tolerating the expression
of a diversity of opinions in society is both necessary to attain the truth and to provide
experiences in living which allow individuals to make more informed choices about how to
live their lives.44
One thing is immediately clear. These two arguments—Rawlsian and Millian—are not
arguments for religious exemptions; they are arguments for toleration as non-interference
with private beliefs and practices—very much in the spirit of the Lockean conception of
42 Sandel (2005, p. 257). Other theorists propose respect-based theories of religious freedom. See for
instance, Modood (2010).
43 Rawls (1971, p. 207).
44 Mill (1999, Chapters 2 and 3).
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toleration outlined above. So it is unsurprising that they would not permit singling out
religion for special legal protection. Rawls argues that his principle of equal liberty of
conscience only requires governments to refrain from imposing a religious orthodoxy and
to refrain from imposing the conception of the good they hold to be true and morally
superior. In A Theory of Justice, he claims that equal liberty of conscience requires
rejecting ‘the notion of a confessional state’ as well as that ‘of the omnipotent laicist state’,
which are both based on the view that the state has the authority to suppress religious and
philosophical doctrines it deems illegitimate.45 Similarly, Mill’s epistemic argument for
tolerating diverse lifestyles only requires that freedom of expression be respected and that
individuals be able to pursue their life plans in the private realm. The only conclusion that
Mill draws is that one’s liberty should only be restricted in order to protect others against
potential harms. Mill famously opposed coercing others for paternalistic reasons (for
instance, to save them from their false beliefs) or for moralistic reasons (because their
behaviour offends and disgusts us). Thus both Rawls’s and Mill’s arguments fall squarely
into the frame of toleration as we defined it: forbidding interference for non-neutral
reasons.
In sum, Leiter focuses on arguments that were intended neither to justify exemptions
from the law, nor to single out religion as such. Rawls and Mill have provided the
canonical liberal arguments for what we could call equal moral freedom—equality before
the law for all individuals regardless of their religious or non-religious beliefs. There is no
direct logical route between toleration as equal moral freedom and special exemptions
from the law on religious grounds. At best, the argument for exemptions could be a
derivative argument. But we should not expect to find it in the canonical texts
themselves.46
Respect and Exemptions
Leiter, however, explores another principled argument for toleration. As we will see, this
argument can justify practices of exemptions, yet it is not an argument for tolerating
practices which are disliked but, rather an argument for supporting practices we should
approve of and view in a positive light. In sum, it is closer to appraisal respect than it is to
recognition respect and toleration.
Leiter considers whether, from a utilitarian perspective, it would make sense to say that
religious beliefs are especially conducive to happiness or have, qua religious beliefs, a
special utility-enhancing function (pp. 59–61). Leiter asks whether this argument can
‘provide a utilitarian rationale for singling out matters of religious conscience for special
protection’ (p. 61). We could thus construe a utilitarian argument asserting that allowing
religious exemptions can be justified if it in fact produces more good than refusing those
exemptions would. Leiter considers, and rejects, this argument. In particular, he refuses to
‘bite the speculative bullet’ and to claim that the potential of religious beliefs to produce
45 Rawls (1971, p. 212).
46 Leiter could object that he examined principled arguments for toleration in order to solve the exemptions
puzzle because toleration provides the moral foundation of religious liberty (see for instance p. 68). From
this point of view, one must inquire into theories of toleration in order to determine whether exemptions are
sometimes required to protect religious freedom and whether they should only be granted to accommodate
religious claims. However, is it not more likely that religious liberty is the moral foundation of toleration
(and not the other way around)? For instance, the Rawlsian argument asserts that the contracting parties of
the original position would not choose an intolerant religious or laicist state because they prefer to protect
their freedom of conscience.
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happiness (by providing existential consolation) is greater than the potential for harm of
religious beliefs. This potential for harm is in fact significantly high since, as Leiter asserts,
the combination of categoricity and insulation from reasons and evidence is a ‘potentially
harmful brew’ (p. 62).
So the only possible ground for exemptions to the law that Leiter (briefly) considers is
the utilitarian argument for principled toleration. For him, it is only if religious beliefs and
practices are conducive of distinctively good outcomes that there is place for special legal
protection. As Leiter claims that conductivity to good outcomes is a source of appraisal
respect, a basis for positive valuation and for being the object of esteem (p. 85), it appears
that he only conceives of exemptions as being justifiable on the basis of ‘appraisal respect’.
Leiter does not take seriously the possibility that the justification of religious exemptions
can be based on something else than positive endorsement of religion. No wonder he
asserts that carving out special legal protection for religion as such is tantamount to
encouraging religion (p. 63).
Consequently, Leiter’s treatment of legal exemptions contains a blind spot. Leiter never
discusses any argument purporting to justify such exemptions, except one argument, the
utilitarian one, which requires adopting a positive valuation of religious belief in general.
Paradoxically, he then draws closer to those very theories of positive valuation of reli-
gion—Sandel’s and Modood’s in our examples—against which Why Tolerate Religion? is
targeted. But this also blinds Leiter to the fact that, in both jurisprudence and the political
theory literature, exemptions are justified by appealing to basic liberal ideals of freedom,
equality and inclusion, rather than a positive valuation of religion per se.47
For example, it has been argued that exemptions are justified because they are required
to give members of religious and cultural minorities ‘the same opportunity as enjoyed by
the majority of citizens to combine their (reasonable) cultural or religious pursuits with
basic civic opportunities like employment and education’; 48 or because they are required
to address the loss of integrity and alienation resulting from acting against the grain of
one’s conscience49; or because, in a society dominated by a religious majority, equality and
non-discrimination sometimes require granting exemptions to religious minorities.50 These
arguments reflect the jurisprudence of most Western countries in which legal exemptions,
when they are granted, are justified on the basis of the protection of anti-discrimination
rights and on the right to freedom of religion and of conscience. These arguments might be
flawed. And they might be flawed for exactly the reason that Leiter identifies, namely, that
they do not explain what it is about religion that makes it a basic and special right. But
Leiter makes it too easy for himself by only considering theories of toleration and respect-
based theories of exemptions, thereby neglecting the most promising approaches to the
‘exemption puzzle’.
Justice and Burden-Shifting Exemptions
After having examined arguments for principled toleration, Leiter concludes that there is
no good reason to single out religion for special protection in the form of legal exemptions.
Yet he has not really addressed the question of the legitimacy of exemptions in the first
47 Seglow (2010).
48 Quong (2006, p. 62).
49 Bou-Habib (2006), Maclure and Taylor (2011, pp. 76–77).
50 Eisgruber and Sager (2007, pp. 202–203), Nussbaum (2008, pp. 20, 116–119). .
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place. The way he deals with the issue, towards the end of the book, is by asking whether
existing exemptions should be extended to non-religious commitments—in particular,
secular convictions of conscience.
Leiter opposes such an extension, and instead defends a version of Brian Barry’s ‘No-
exemptions approach’.51 In Leiter’s view, no exemptions should be allowed, neither for
secular nor for religious commitments, with the exception of exemptions that do not
impose any burden or cost on those who are not exempted. Leiter highlights the practical
difficulties associated with expanding the regimes of religious exemptions to all claims of
conscience: such a universalization would generalize and constitutionalize the right not to
comply with the law, making it harder to enforce the law; moreover, it is difficult for courts
to assess the authenticity of individual claims of conscience (p. 94–96).
Putting aside those important practical concerns, Leiter raises one principled objection to
practices of exemptions; namely, those practices ‘often impose burdens on those who have
no claim of exemption’ (p. 99). For instance, as he points out, in periods of forced induction
into the army, when someone is exempted from military service on conscientious grounds,
the burden of taking up arms must be shouldered by another citizen who has no claim to be a
conscientious objector. Leiter does not cite many examples of burden-shifting exemptions to
the law, but several come tomind. For instance, onemay argue that, in countries where health
services are publicly subsidized, exempting some religious groups from drug laws may
increase the social costs related to the treatment of drug addiction, and perhaps exemptions
from laws requiring the wearing of helmets for motorcycle drivers and for construction
workers may increase public health expenditures related to head injury treatments.
Such considerations are plausible. Yet they seem to be dependent on a prior theory of
fairness, equality, and justice—of the kind that, as we pointed out, Leiter fails to consider.
Still, we may ask: on which implicit theory of justice, of fair distribution of the burdens and
benefits of social cooperation, does Leiter rely when he claims that burden-shifting
exemptions impose an unjust burden on those who have no claim to being exempted from
the law? As he provides no clues to answer this question, it seems that Leiter’s argument
amounts to saying that any shift in the existing distribution of burdens is unfair by the sheer
fact of introducing a modification into the existing pattern of distribution of burdens of
social cooperation. This assumes that currently existing laws and institutional arrange-
ments are already fair and constitute an appropriate baseline against which demands for
exemptions can be evaluated from a moral point of view. There is no reason, however, to
assume that currently existing laws and administrative regulations provide an impartial
standpoint to assess whether demands for exemptions impose unfair burdens on the rest of
society. We need an independent criterion, one not tied to existing institutions, laws, and
practices in order to make valid judgments about the fairness of the distribution of the
burdens placed by coercive laws upon citizens embracing different religious and philo-
sophical views.
It is not our aim here is to provide such a criterion. We simply want to highlight that
Leiter’s endorsement of the rule of ‘No-exemption except for non-burden-shifting
exemptions’ commits what we call the ‘status-quo neutrality’ fallacy. In other words,
Leiter embraces a theoretical position, which takes the existing distribution of burdens and
benefits in society for granted and which fails to provide an impartial baseline from which
current claims about inequalities or unjust treatment can be normatively assessed.52 The
51 Barry (2001, pp. 40–50). Barry’s view, however, is that exemptions are not required by justice but can
nonetheless be required by prudence.
52 See Laborde (2008, p. 82).
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objection to all burden-shifting exemptions simply assumes that the actual distribution of
burdens under a regime of universally applicable laws with no possibility for exemptions
(except for non-burden-shifting ones) is already fair and necessarily unproblematic.
Adopting this viewpoint, Leiter proves incapable of thinking about regimes of legal
exemptions to the law for conscientious citizens through the critical lenses of a conception
of justice. As a result, he fails to develop a convincing principled argument against
practices of exemptions to the law.
Conclusion: Why Tolerate Conscience?
The title of this article is an amphibology. By it, we want to ask Leiter two questions,
slightly different from the one he asks in the title of his book, Why Tolerate religion? First,
Leiter maintains that while there is nothing special about religion, conscience should be the
object of toleration. However, in section ‘‘Religion and Conscience’’, we argued that Leiter
is hard-pressed to distinguish between religious and secular claims of conscience. But then,
why should secular conscience be tolerated when it exhibits exactly the same features as
religion (namely, categoricity, existential consolation and insulation from empirical evi-
dence)? Although he spends much time and effort defining religion, Leiter does not tell us
what exactly in conscience, whether it is secular or religious, is worthy of toleration.
Should we tolerate conscience because conscientious beliefs make categorical demands,
because they are central to individuals’ identities, because people are happier when they
are able to live in accordance with their consciences, or because of something else? In
other words, why tolerate conscience? Second, in section ‘‘Toleration, Respect and
Exemptions’’, we contrasted classical theories of toleration as non-interference with
individuals’ private choices and theories of legal exemptions. We argued that, by
addressing the issues raised by special religious exemptions only through the lenses of
toleration (and appraisal respect), Leiter misses the point of exemptions. His approach
seems to be question-begging. Of course principled toleration does not offer reasons to
single out religion as the sole recipient of legal exemptions: it does not provide a justifi-
cation for exemptions in the first place. Why does Leiter assume that toleration is the most
salient political concept to discuss the legitimacy of practices of legal exemptions for
religious and secular claims of conscience? Indeed, why tolerate conscience?
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